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How I Would Like The IFP To Be

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Avatar for Adeilton_Filho
Written by   69
1 year ago

Introducion

In this text I will address how I think an IFP (Infrastructure Funding Plan) should be. I certainly disagree with how it can possibly be implemented, but I don't disagree with its importance for the BCH, since IFP would be a solution to increase the security and autonomy of the BCH, that is indisputable. However, this theme still brings a lot of controversy and in these moments of crisis it is always good to remember the reason why we are united, despite all our differences.

There is a wonderful text by George with the title: “A Manifesto for the Next 10 Years of Bitcoin (Cash)” it deserves be read and that presents a summary of our pretensions and hopes for BCH. But the text lacked what for me is also a characteristic that defines our desires with BCH, which is independence. Unlike BTC, I believe that we all have concerns about BCH's freedom and independence.

IFP allows the security and independence of the BCH to be maintained over time, and therefore, somehow an alternative must be created to finally promote the advances necessary for this sustainable development. In this context, I question myself; Why didn't the other nodes create their investment fund proposals? If we calm down we will see that no one is actually against IFP, in fact we are against the uncompromising way in which node ABC wants to implement. That is the question.

I don't know what made Amaury take such a harsh decision. Reading his last text on the subject, I noticed that he quotes Satoshi and game theory, to justify his action. I do not imagine where this confidence comes from that this can work, nor do I know what goes on in his head and those who support him. But I know that he is wrong to be uncompromising, because there is something called emotional payoff, and when I draw the matrix the result of your IFP is not the dominant strategy.

For example: Imagine someone who suddenly wants to buy a shirt for less than $ 20.00 and the seller is offering a shirt for $ 20.00, so the alleged customer asks for a discount, and the seller says he can give a discount, then the customer is looking forward to the discount amount, so the seller says $ 19.99. Mathematically the consumer would buy the shirt, but in the real world, the customer would be furious. This is emotional payoff. The customer prefers to lose $ 0.01 instead of accepting the seller's proposal.

So, even if everyone agrees on a proposal for a fund that would benefit BCH, it is preferable to forgo it if that implementation is being proposed in a way that offends the community. So, I thought of an IFP, which could be implemented to satisfy BCH's need for independence and sustainability. So that it was as less invasive as possible, respecting the freedoms that are necessary and that it covers all agents of that system.

A new method

The BCH has several nodes and this is very important. All nodes want the best for BCH and all have their importance for network security. They all have some kind of foundation, and they certainly would not dispense with a donation. In this context, everyone should, in some way, be part of some type of “IFP” financing.

I thought of the following solution; Let us imagine that each node is linked to a foundation and that it is beyond presenting its proposal of how it works for the benefit of the network and how it invests in its development. It also offered an SLP token in exchange for BCH to accumulate funds to maintain its services. By assumption there could be tokens like:

  • BITCOIN UNLIMITED NODES (BUN);

  • BITCOIN ABC NODES (ABC);

  • BCHN NODES (CHN);

  • BCHD NODES (CHD);

  • FLOWEE THE HUB NODES (FHB);

  • BITCOIN XT NODES (BXT);

  • BITCOIN VERDE NODES (VER);

    there could be, for example, and other foundations such as;

  • FLIPSTARTER (FST);

  • EATBCH (ECH).

    If the ignored value of the base currency was 8%. Each token could correspond to a recovery of 1% of 6.5 BCH, which is the current value of the base of the coin, therefore 6,500,000 satoshis, and if the miner wanted, he could buy a basket of tokens or choose eight units of a single token to be able to fully receive the coinbase reward. It is important to note that the price is offered by the foundation, how much they need to collect, and how much they believe they can sell. Another observation is that the miners do not know which block they are going to mine, so the value of the token will be much lower than 0.065BCH, as it will be necessary to send the tokens on each attempt. So the costs will be well distributed. Tokens would only have a weight of one percent if they all had the same price, otherwise their weight will be proportional to the value of the highest price among tokens. To avoid a price war. As below:

According to the table above, a miner who wanted to receive 100% of the coinbase, and not just 92% would be enough, for example, to buy 10 tokens (BUN) or (ABC), or 8 tokens (FHB) or a mix of 9 (ABC) , 10 (ECH) and 10 (FST).

If the miner does not want to purchase the token, he will receive a discount, for example, of 8% in his reward for each block mined, and the entire network would gain from deflation, as these 8% would disappear from the network, causing the BCH to be more scarce. Any miner, who does not take coins from the coinbase, can reduce the supply of coins in the BCH and BTC network.

It would be up to the miner, at every attempt to mine a block, to add a transaction from the token that was purchased to an burns address . Thus, it would prove to the entire network that the miner contributed with some node (or foundation that has a recognized token). Otherwise, the miner and the network would benefit from deflation.

Not only that, anyone could now contribute to their favorite foundation. Buying tokens and then donating to miners whith faucets. Small miners and anonymous miners would certainly source from these faucets. Thus the responsibility for the development of the network would be shared with everyone. It would also be possible to sell your tokens on the future market and thus have stability in the foundation's resources.

Conclusion

In this way, developers are obliged to work hard and make significant contributions, because otherwise nobody would buy their tokens. Because developers cannot receive financial resources without an incentive to continue receiving them. In short, this proposal creates a new market to encourage the development of BCH that includes everyone; Miners, investors, developers and users. Without the dictatorial imposition and that is accessible to all.
I admit that I do not know how to design such a system, as I am an economist and not a developer, so I think it is important to communicate that any operational errors may be present in the text, as it is only a conjecture to raise ideas to those who have more technical capacity, so that perhaps it can help with new ideas for a new form of IFP.

___ // __

I hope you liked the text. Be sure to comment what you think. This text may have several grammatical flaws, since English is not my native language. I would be grateful for any corrections, grammatical or methodological.

Peace be on you.

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Avatar for Adeilton_Filho
Written by   69
1 year ago
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Comments

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$ 0.00
1 year ago

I'm making another separate comment because my first one was long enough and it appears one cannot reply to oneself on this platform. I've thought of another way that such a system would either be unfair or cheat-able. Suppose you require all nodes that get funding to be publicly available. Now a miner can simply anonymously fork a project and change the name, but keep everything the same. Well, it's publicly available . Again, that miner can effectively pay themselves. Suppose everyone agrees to centralized enforcement (terrible idea) and only allows funding to projects with identity-proved lead developers. Now all of the sudden the very entity that founded bitcoin (Satoshi Nakamoto) is excluded from providing node software.

Regarding the sudden massive "need" to fund developers in general, I've previously posted this article: https://read.cash/@The00Dustin/funding-vs-tax-plan-vs-mandate-maybe-these-terms-dont-matter-975e69f2

Quite frankly, my personal opinion is that this "need" is a sybil attack, and so far, every well-meaning suggestion I've seen allows for corruption (wherein an entity controls funding). Relevantly, I've also previously posted this article: https://read.cash/@The00Dustin/moneypowercorruption-cd95736f

$ 0.00
1 year ago

If we calm down we will see that no one is actually against IFP

We are against taking a cut from the block reward for any reason.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

f we calm down we will see that no one is actually against IFP

We are against taking a cut from the block reward for any reason.

In my example, the miner has the option to choose. We are all in the same boat. if the miner helps the BCH developers, the users demanded more, the price increases and everyone wins.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

It is not voluntary in the IFP branch, and it is not from the miners.

But all this is relevant now, because there will be a non-IFP branch, and the central bank branch will end up forgotten.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

Interesting thoughts, thanks for sharing them.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

Thank you very much!

$ 0.00
1 year ago

This is a neat and well thought out idea that probably wouldn't be difficult to implpment, but my problem with enforced funding is centralization. No matter how you track and enforce it, someone has to be in charge of something. If someone is in charge, that someone can be biased, corrupted, etc.

Consider a scenario where miner A actually develops their own proprietary node software. It is not right to make them donate to other node projects when they are paying their own developers. So let's assign that miner a coin that they can "sell" to themselves. That's the simple solution, except then miner B claims to develop their own proprietary node software, and you cannot prove that they don't. So let's assign that miner a coin that they can "sell" to themselves. Ooops, now miner B has an advantage over everyone else.

The alternative is to require some sort of proof. Suppose miner A doesn't want to provide proof because they are trying to protect their intellectual property. So we don't give miner A their own coin. Ooops, now miner A has a disadvantage compared to everyone else. Why should miner A support and protect BCH in that scenario?

You cannot centralize decentralization.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

My claim is not centralization to decentralization. If the miner wants to have the costs of developing a node to try to win 100% of the coinbase, he will certainly have losses, but the choice is his. Honestly, there is no corruption problem in this system and it remains decentralized. Anyone can contribute to this system. If an enthusiast wants to donate 10 BCH, he can buy that amount in a token of his favorite Foundation, and donate it to a miner, and thus, everyone wins! If the miner does not want to donate the coins disappear and the BCH will be scarcer, and once again everyone wins. Imagine the impact of this news for Marketing - Miner decided not to donate and made BCH more scarce than BTC -

$ 0.00
1 year ago

Idealistically it may work, but I am missing something you are thinking. As it stands, it still seems like either these foundations are decided on by a centralized entity, or they can be faked. One way involves centralization which allows for bias and control, the other way allows cheating. Both of those ways add human corruption to a system that is working mainly because it keeps that out.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

I respect your opinion and consider your concern to be correct, but the risks of corruption and cheating are low. As in the current protocol, in which the miner is encouraged not to attack the network, as the costs would be greater than the gains. The miner would have a higher cost to form collusions and other ways to cheat the game. I would like you to think about the costs and not just the opportunistic attitudes of the agents involved in this game. Costs can be divided into direct and indirect

The first direct cost would be to pay a team to build your system and generate a report, as well as to convince the other nodes that your node is a legitimate node. The second is the cost of the node in dispensing with a legitimate donation and colluding with the miner, who obviously would like to erase less than the value of a legitimate donation. The third cost is the reduction of donations due to the distrust of other users and enthusiasts of BCH. In other words, the discrimination you mentioned is not a problem, but part of the solution.

The first indirect cost would be the loss of incentive for better projects to the BCH, because by cheating the miner it would be weakening the development of the BCH. The second indirect cost is the opportunity cost of miners and developers with the loss of BCH inflation.

Everything is placed in the hands of the market. Note that the risks are very low, as they involve only a small percentage of the coinbase. But that can significantly enhance the development of BCH.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

I can admit that you may be correct regarding the game theory surrounding the risk of cheating being if the control is decentralized. My bigger concern is with centralized control. If implementation requires an authority, then outside entities can manipulate, coerce, and possibly even control the authority. IMO, this the biggest problem Bitcoin has faced since at least 2013. Separately, there are also plenty of very good arguments out there showcasing the many reasons why funding from the coinbase simply isn't necessary.

$ 0.00
1 year ago

Thanks for putting thought into designing a win-win IFP-like funding mechanism. It is not easy and ABC has not really tried to figure one out. I think BCH would benefit from a good one. The anti-BCH forces will try to stop any real discussions on such ideas.

$ 0.00
1 year ago