This literature report proposes an alternative look at the two articles, namely Media in Hungary: Three Pillars of an Illiberal Democracy (abbreviated to “Media in Hungary” below), and Media Capture in New Authoritarian States: the Case of Turkey (abbreviated to “the Case of Turkey” below) by applying the criteria formulated by Gerschwerski in his article “The Three Pillars of Stability” to firstly, propose that the media capture is a form of co-optation, secondly, to suggest that based on categorization of strategies of media capture mentioned in Media in Hungary and The Case of Turkey, the process of media capture seems to be the dominant aim supported by legitimation and repression, which seem to be the means of achieving that aim and finally, to draw parallels between the strategies the two regimes use and suggest that the striking similarities are not only simply part of the process of autocratization, but that they also may have been shaped by other factors, such as the economic situation in the media market.
Gerschewski’s pillars – legitimation, repression, and co-optation – ensure long-term survival of an authoritarian regime. If co-optation in Gerschewski’s definition is a form of “tying strategically relevant actors to the regime elite”, then it could be said that ‘media capture’ is a form of co-optation. The actor “needs to be persuaded not to exercise their power to obstruct” and instead “use their resources in line with the ruling elite’s demands”, so Gerschewski. Both the Hungarian and the Turkish regime do just that in relation to media, which they perceive as both a political actor, as well as a political resource, capable to provide invaluable support to the government in shaping the public perception of it. Both articles support this: Media in Hungary, as well as the Case of Turkey stress to what great lengths the ruling parties in each country go to disarm critical media and, if not eradicate it completely, then at least confine it to the sidelines. The aim of both governments is, therefore, to bring the media in line with the current political goals of the government, as well as minimize the opposition to its policies. This fits Gerschewski’s definition of co-optation perfectly.
If one were to consider the problem of media capture through the criterion proposed by Gerschewski further, one could then see an interesting pattern, namely that in both Hungary and Turkey, the process of media capture seems to be an aim in itself: such an important institution as this must be assimilated with no effort spared. The precise tactics that the two governments use are therefore truly diverse and seem to tackle this challenge from all sides. Yet, one may still neatly group them together in two categories – “maintaining facades” and “exercising pressure”, outlined in more detail below. Consequently, one must wonder: are those two ‘ways’ of capturing media really all that different to Gerschewski’s “legitimation” and “repression”?
‘Maintaining facades’ seems to be nothing other than the regimes’ attempt to lend their activity a sense of legitimacy by choosing to work through oversight institutions rather than “over their head” (Hungary) and using the existing legal framework of the Constitution and the Penal Code for political purposes rather than explicitly renouncing the regime’s commitment to operating within limitations laid down by law (Turkey). In Hungary, the executive thus permeates public bodies, all in accordance with due process as it might seem, but with the consequence that those bodies become informally accountable to it. In Turkey, in turn, the executive ‘strong-arms’ the courts, probably much like the journalists, “self-censor” themselves to guarantee a verdict that would be in line with the executive’s policy; yet on the surface, no rules are broken, the executive is holding itself in line. The idea that the tactic of “maintaining facades” is similar to Gerschewski’s “legitimation” may be supported by his example of disillusionment as the opposite of legitimation. If a regime oversteps certain boundaries like due process, then the people’s perception of it is negatively affected. This is exactly what the regimes in Turkey and Hungary are trying to avoid by using strategies of media capture that work not over, but through the existing institutional or legal framework.
‘Exercising pressure’ is, consequently, a form of what Gerschewski calls “low intensity repression / low intensity coercion”, where the defining characteristic is that the government does not “get their hands dirty” by using violent tactics; instead of terminating the players on the media arena directly, it chooses to slowly edge the ‘enemies of the state’ out by changing the landscape of the arena itself. The examples of this “low intensity repression” are numerous: from “manipulated tenders” in Turkey to benefiting politically connected enterprises in Hungary; from “punitive tax measures” on media groups such as Dogan in Turkey to “sabotaging and discrediting” of critical media in Hungary; finally, from using advertisement distribution and bans as “carrot and stick” (BIK, RTÜK) and thus encouraging self-censorship in the journalist community to allowing particular businessmen the use of state budget money for the purpose of purchasing media outlets that have fallen out of the government’s favour (Hungary).
One cannot overlook the fact how two very different regimes – one ex-Communist, the other with a deep religious and partiotic foundation – use very similar strategies of what could be described as “market-based pressure and political favouritism”. If one was to see both as authoritarian, and the process of media capture as institutional co-optation, then one must ask the question: do the other two “pillars”, namely “legitimation” and “repression” (its low-intensity form) merely accompany the task of institutional co-optation (as equals), or whether they are in a way the tools or rather conditions, in which co-optation takes place and are therefore secondary to it?
A further question that one may ask themselves is: how much, if at all, the specifics of Turkey’s and Hungary’s economic, political and social systems have played a part in enabling the process of autocratization? Media in Hungary and The Case of Turkey both mention economic factors, which may have played a part: the rise of neoliberalism in Turkey seems to have contributed to formation of a monopoly over media outlets, thus greatly simplifying the task of Erdogan’s regime of obtaining control over them. In Hungary, respectively, the central economic factor was the 2008 crisis that has affected the media by shrinking the spectrum of available advertisement sources and which has brought the state to the foreground, thus increasing the importance of media outlets forming a good relationship with this key player. However, ideological, historical and cultural reasons may be at play here too, and so a detailed investigation into the breadth of factors that have turned Turkey into ‘fertile soil’ for the rise of a new autocracy could definitely be the subject of future case studies on Turkey and Hungary.
*This is my own work.*
“To what extent do the strategies of media capture in Turkey and Hungary overlap? Could the strategies outlined in “Media in Hungary: Three Pillars of an Illiberal Democracy” and “Media Capture in New Authoritarian States: The Case of Turkey” be reconciled with the analytical framework proposed by J. Gerschewski in “The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes? Can the transitions we are seeing in Turkey and Hungary have further causes other than the rational choices of political actors involved
