The Problem With the Pivot - Robert Ross - A critical review.

Ross argues that the pivot created by Obama is wrong because it just compounds the security risk in the Asian region. A security risk that started when China became aggressive and behave[ed] in a way that … aroused suspicion abroad (Ross 2012, 2), because China knows they can’t stand the military might of the US. This essay argues that Obama is not doing anything new with the pivot since this is the same strategy used against the USSR in the Cold War. To support this argument, identity and its role on foreign policy must be defined so the pivot can be shown as a repackaged containment strategy reminiscent of the Cold War era. The reason why this has been adapted needs to be provided and examined in order to justify disagreement with Ross’ article.

There is nothing new with how China is behaving that is arousing suspicion, identity plays a big part of this. The US and China have ideological differences, the US being a democratic state while China is a communist state that will always lead suspicions. The phrase “The good guys versus the Bad guys” as Professor Makinda states, historically has been ubiquitous in how US foreign policy resembles its image, as a state that came from a frontier mentality and label a conflicting identity as a suspicious “other” (Campbell 1998, 9).

What is identity? David Campbell states “Identity is constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behaviour” (Campbell 1998, 9). How a state acts can affect international relations and thus becomes the “others’” and reinforces or creates a new variant to an already established American image (Campbell 1998, 131) of an external threat to its security. Ross purports to a US foreign policy that is so liberal thinking that the article attempts to convince the reader that it would be better to adapt an appeasement strategic employed toward Germany Pre-World War 2. We all know where that leads to, a reinforcement of Chinas’ confidence and capability as a counter balancing power to the US supremacy.

A new US policy compounds… regional stability (Ross 2012, 2) is very hard to swallow since past history has taught us that a “counter balancing stance” (Walt, 1985) by regional players have ensured that any threatening states are checked in, fears by the players are mitigated when, states facing an external threat overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat (Walt 1985, 15). So when Ross states that the region is becoming a tense region through continued US containment, does not ring true in hindsight of the tendency for states to balance a rising threat.

“The United States has been the anchor of global security. This has meant doing more than forging international agreements -- it has meant enforcing them. The burdens of leadership are often heavy, but the world is a better place because we have borne them.”

President Barrack Obama succinctly expressed the US stance based on identity based Foreign Policy in his recent speech regarding the Syrian use of chemical weapons that the order it established while in the Cold War and post have ensured a relative peace. A peace borne out of its Puritan legacy to do what is deemed right (Campbell 1998, 130-132).

Ross analyses that the US is overestimating the Chinese navy through their acquisition of an aircraft carrier, an old one from Russia and their newly created one is not up to scratch. In terms of hard power (Nye, 2004), the Chinese do pale in comparison to the US, however, the security threat is not solely based on Chinese/US comparison but within the states around the Asian region.  This invalidates Ross’ view that the pivot is destabilising the region, through its rebadged containment strategy.

Then there is the internal problem that China is facing with its rising class gap and the social unrest with high unemployment. Yes, this does weaken the Chinese but is this enough to assuage the risk towards US allies within the region since its policies are becoming more unilateralist and more dangerous (Kurlantzick 2010, 59). As Ross puts it the PLA have been acting aggressively to get sympathy and legitimacy from its nationalist movements (Ross 2012, 3).

The increase in military presence in Asia by US military are making the Chinese leaders hesitant in backing down as they will lose face with their nationalists’ population (Ross 2012, 5), who are rising in anger from disputes regarding maritime territory, namely the Senkaku Islands against the Japanese and the Spratly islands the Philippines and Vietnam.

Even though the US have been in the region for quite some time it seems the Chinese are growing in confidence, Ross states they are just puffing their chests however I think Ross fails to comprehend that China is becoming aggressive and is threatening its neighbours. By sending naval forces with contested parts of the Spratly Islands and subsequently creating a garrison there Walt’s’ point of counter balance alignment (Walt 1985, 13-14) are driving the states in the region to seek US strategic alliances. There is a failure in taking into account the machinations of the smaller states such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan in convincing the US of their importance as a buffer for ideological difference (Bush and Keyman 1997, 312) between their democratic governments against Chinas’ communist leaning government threatening the stability of the Asian region.

There is some truth, however, when Ross states “the US has… unnecessarily challenged Beijing by boosting its military presence in the East Asian mainland” (Ross 2012, 5) as this does not give ground for Chinas’ leaders to back down from their aggressive posturing, in fear of losing their legitimacy with their nationalist movement. Realistically though, does this form a basis to stop an already aggressive state by a coalition lead by the US to contain Chinas’ sphere of influence. Being poses a credible threat to its Asian neighbour.

Ross clearly states that the US should back down from being a balance against China and presents an alternative US policy of restraint, rather than alarmism, will best serve U.S. national security (Ross 1998, 8). How will this be taken by its allies if it decreases its military presence? This would compound the countries within the region to increase their capabilities creating an even bigger threat to regional security. Worse yet this could signal to the allies that the US are abandoning them and that is a fear of the US in ideological terms based on defection to the other side as a form of “bandwagon[ing]” (Walt 1985, 13-15).

In conclusion, Ross raises some good points to consider for international relations analysts and for US foreign policy makers. This does not, however, warrant the articles argument that the pivot created by Obama is wrong, as it is based on what is a threat based on ideology between China and the US. As for compounding the security risk in the Asian region, it does bring a view that it adds to the risk but more importantly the stated goals of the pivot is creating a counterbalancing effect on a rising China. A sense of order created by the US post World War 2 allowed for a China to compete the US economically, and some even say militarily. Again it does not warrant a reason enough for the US to step back from the containment it employed with the USSR in the Cold War, after all it did win this war in the end. It would be foolish to not learn from its past especially when as a new imagined state (Campbell 1998,  131) the American identity and how it influences Foreign Policy stem from it “internal” preservation with the frontier, Asian region. The question that needs to be asked is, What kind of world will we live in if the United States of America… choose to look the other way? (Obama 2013).

Reference

K. D. Bush and E. F. Keyman, "Identity-based conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold War World", Global Governance, 3(3), 1997, pp. 311-328.

David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

Joshua Kurlantzick (2002): China: Economic power, political enigma, The Washington Quarterly, 25:3, 59-67

Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

Obama, Barrack, 2013. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria.

Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the balance of World Power", International Security, 9(4), 1985, pp. 3-43