Does morality matter in security policy?
A loaded question that is very relevant to the Asian region, as question deals with moral dilemmas posed with the use of military action and its impact on civilian lives. David Fisher (see reference at end of article for full details) argues that policy elites use optimism and moralism in the policies they announce, but within closed doors the language of power is prevalent that begs the question, is it moonshine or do moral considerations sometimes shape security policies. And to support this argument he provides three examples the legacy of area bombing; the moral panic over nuclear weapons and the morality of human intervention that spans over half a century.
This review will argue that Fisher hits the nail in the head with how security policies are shaped by moralism and optimism however there are still actions by states that would suggest morals are but a fraction of the reasons some policies are implemented. To support this, three examples given by Fisher will be analyzed in order to draw on how they help security policies that needs hard power to implement optimistic and moralistic security policies. Fisher states these areas of debate are closely interlinked by a profound ethical concern for the protection of innocent civilians from attack, as required by the Just War principles of non-combatant immunity.
The legacy of area bombing is the beginning of the new internationally accepted security policy that puts in vogue the Just War principles by the lessons learnt through debate and guilt of the effects it had on innocent lives destroyed by this policy. The British campaign at the closing of the war to attempt at weakening the Germans citizenry support for the Nazi regime on strengthened the German peoples will to resist. Looking at this from the perspective of China in their modern experience, what comes to mind in the rape of Nanjing by the Japanese, through their indiscriminate abuse of civilians propelled and hardened the Chinese in their struggle against the Japanese which draws comparison the resolve shown in the European side at the time of WW2.
Where the Japanese did not have any qualms implementing the destruction wrought on the Chinese at the height of their occupation of China, shame discourse does not dominate Japanese images; shame is a product of Western understandings of Japan (Thorsten2004, pp. 223-4). Post WW2 the British and the Japanese supports Fishers article that moral condemnation on area bombing policies by the British did give impetus to change, as he states the debates at that time were not extensive it did set about a process of change towards the protection of innocent civilians as prescribed by Just War principles. Fisher is good at clearly showing how Just War principles have been able to slowly shape security policies by providing as evidence the principles of non-combatant immunity agreed internationally making it immoral and in breach of Just War constraint and illegal by international law to carry out policies of city bombing (Fisher 2013, pp.131-3).
This gives a dimension that Callahan argues regarding the …complex[ities]… of links between defeat, humiliation, and revenge. (Callahan 2004, 201), that is the historical narratives made by Fisher towards the guilt associated with area bombings; although Callahan gives the picture of China and its humiliation we can draw this as guilt. Both are psychological cure of an irrational emotion that needs to be cured (Callahan 2004, 201). The cure to the irrational guilt is the implementation of change towards policies that are morally acceptable for the international community without forgetting liberalism weaknesses to prevent any morally acceptable goals from failing and Fisher hints at this in ending his point on the legacy of area bombing.
The moral panic over nuclear weapons, Fishers argues the morality of using nuclear weapons because of the scale of casualties resulting from their use. He points that there was a great backlash to the new nuclear doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’, from the Chinese perspectives these backlash allowed Mao to exploit the morality argument by using classical Chinese strategy of ‘the empty city’ stratagem (Kissinger 2011, pp. 101-2). Provoking the Americans to use their weapons against the Chinese, importantly we must remember that Mao controlled the CCP hence their policies adapted at the height of tensions between American and China that created the ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ (Kissinger 2011, 331).
Fisher points to the moral concerns that were associated with the vast devastation caused through the initial use and fallout from nuclear bomb use, as he points out Just War principle would logically lead towards constructivist thinking on the belief that ethical and legal principles guides foreign policy (Walt 1998, pp. 40-1). And in the case of Mao’s ‘empty city stratagem’ this constructivist thinking allowed China to exert foreign policies that ran contradictory to US military power even at the time when it was still recovering from the civil war post WW2. Fishers article hits the nail in the moral argument from the Chinese perspective but fails the US foreign policy because of the backlash they had in being able to use their nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Fisher 2013, pp. 133-4).
Highlighting the inherent weakness of constructivist thinking, Fisher presents the memoirs of Michael Howard:
‘Few of us shared the belief of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament that the moral dilemma created by the invention of nuclear weapons could be solved by simply abolishing them, but none of us could ignore the profound moral problems created by their possession, let alone their use.’ (Howard 2006, pp. 159-9)
From this we can agree that Fisher agrees with the weaknesses both Walt and Snyder have argued as the constructivist failure of having no central theme that appeals to all and relying heavily on successful cross cultural dialogue.
In agreeing with Fishers’ argument that morality does matter in security policies we need to understand that from pre-modern Chinese experience with the western countries morally they have been the victims of the so called barbarians, even with Just War principles the Chinese remember the ‘century of humiliation’ as a lesson that there is no room for allowing great powers to dictate the political will within China’s internal or external policies. However, putting this back to the relevance of nuclear panic, ethical grounds did not mean the total abolishment of nuclear arsenal because there will always be the need to back morally shaped policies with military might (Walt, 1994, 43).
The morality of human intervention Fisher argues is that the rediscovery of altruism and universality by the recognition of the Responsibility to Protect by the UN and the legitimacy of intervention is an important moral victory (Fisher 2013, 144). From the Chinese perspective they would be looking at this from their experiences through the lessons learnt in the pre-modern dealing with the rest of the world. The Opium wars lessons of starting the decline of China’s Sinocentric through foreigners opening the borders by force in the ‘century of humiliation’ (Kissinger 2011, 5-32).
What comes to mind is the western powers excuse of morally grounded military adventures into China at that period, with this in mind the failings of China at that time was their aloofness towards the foreigners while the western powers exploited these failings. Fishers’ statement of the ‘lawful defense of the innocent from unjust death’ constituted just cause for war would give the Chinese reasons to look at human interventions with their past experience and does bring home the thinking that what’s said in public may not necessarily be what’s intended behind closed doors (Pearson 2013).
In conclusion Fisher has written a great and valid article that answers the main thesis of this review, by hitting the nail in the head security policies that are shaped by moralism and optimism however actions taken by states only influence a fraction of some policies implemented. With the area bombings he gives a fresh and grounded background as to how Just War principles were rediscovered even from little public debate. Fisher states that this is a kind of moral progress. Building further on this progress through the argument that nuclear weapons brought about the moral panic of using these weapons as a deterrent with the inherent knowledge that innocent civilian lives will be lost providing Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the only time these weapons were ever used, and the taboo it created after being used from the great many moral debates of the stated population decimating targeting as a threat to deter their use. Interestingly this thinking became the cornerstone in Mao’s ‘empty city stratagem’. Lastly human intervention as a reason to provide defense for innocent lives goes on to give us a peak at China’s fear of the international communities willingness now that morals are applied, Fisher succinctly captures this mood when he states a state that fails to protect its people may forfeit its right to self-determination. However what must be remembered is the lessons that have been learnt by China in the last two centuries with its dealings with the western world and how although Just War principles were known by the western powers that forced their way into China’s Sino centric world. The moral language still did not fully capture their intent on dominating it. Two questions come to mind when these things are brought forward, what lessons are we willing to remember and in whose perspective do we ask?
Reference
William A. Callahan. 2004. “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism.” Alternatives 29: 199-218.
David Fisher. 2013. “Does Morality Matter in Security Policy?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:3, 129-146.
Michael Howard. 2006. “Captain Professor: The Memoirs of Sir Michael Howard.” 159-159. London: Continuum.
Henry Kissinger. 2011. On China. New York: Penguin Books.
Anna Pearson. 2013. Why North Korea hates Frank Feinstein. Sydney Morning Herald. http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/why-north-korea-hates-frank-feinstein-20131219-2zly3.html
Marie Thorsten. 2004. “Shame to Vengeance: The Grand Cliché of the Japanese Superstate.” Alternatives 29, 219-238.
Stephen M. Walt. 1998. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy 110: 29-32.
