Conventional warfare is not something all countries can wage, especially when they had to face a superior military force like United Kingdom had in the beginning of the 20th century. Successfully defeating it required that a country who doesn’t have the resources must engage in unconventional warfare like guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Ireland was one of these countries who successfully defeated the British. What were the factors leading to British Intelligence defeat and did the Irish truly succeed in their counter espionage against British Secret Service in the 1916 – 1921 before the truce was signed.

To answer this we will break down three factors that brought about British defeat. The first factor looks at the how the British handled Ireland before and after the Easter Uprising and the political ramifications. Second looks at the actors leading the intelligence war against the British authorities in Dublin castle and how they went about this. And third compares military intelligence to political intelligence in the period leading up to the Anglo-Irish treaty.

The British Secret service focus on Ireland as an area of concern was primarily targeted towards German intrigues[1] and didn’t concern itself with the political rise of Irish nationalist movements like the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This is important to note since a government wanting to have a stable state must not only have its attention outside of its borders, but must ensure no “... threats could come from groups that seek to overthrow the government by illegal means, [and] use violence to change government policies…”[2].

The IRB planned and executed the Easter Uprising on the 24th of April 1916 which was not penetrated by the British Secret Service as the society learnt from Robert Emmett’s failed rebellion in 1803 to keep planned uprising to minimum thereby prevent the British from discovering. This is an important point for the British authorities who are …waiting for a specific criminal act on which to focus … concerning relevant individuals or groups… it is necessary to use informers, who penetrate the groups involved and operate like spies[3].

While the IRB maintained a tight control of leaks within their small circle the British discovered the planned uprising from Sir Roger Casement capture by the British en-route from Germany to Ireland. He had gained German support for the planned uprising through a shipment of arms for the uprising. Implicating himself by his letters with …thinly concealed references to German support for the liberation of the four green fields from the ‘stranger’ to Mrs Green, a well-known Irish nationalist[4]. Giving credit to British SIGINT the efforts towards German intrigues the British could have prevented the revolt but the MI5’s main Irish expert … refused, possibly in the hope that the Rising would go ahead and force the government to crush what they saw as a German conspiracy with Irish nationalists[5].

As the leaders of the uprising foresaw by the lessons learnt of Emmett’s sacrifice, they were prepared to give their lives, being martyred for their cause. The British however failed to learn that prevention of the uprising would have stopped the much more important development of Irish nationalism[6] from taking root in Ireland by the expedient execution of the leaders through military court. This failure is attributed to the lack of co-ordination between the military, the police and the military intelligence agencies[7] to correctly weight the political ramifications by executing the rebel leaders after they had surrendered. The British failed to grasp because of uncoordinated operating in Ireland, the police force had the intelligence which went to deaf ears as it was not used intelligently in forecasting the ramifications of the execution.

Adding to this the British contingent consisted of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), who were not waging a war before 1920 but were trying to maintain law and order… the RIC’s well-tuned antennae picked up right away on the anti-government mood swing.[8] This information should’ve been used by the British secret service in analysing the available information to make judgements about the capabilities, intentions and actions… a vital part of the intelligence process[9].

By the lack of coordination between the RIC and MI5 the martyrdom of the rebel leaders, Irish nationalism gained support. The major impact it has is that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was created and lead by the militant leader Michael Collins, leading the IRA to commit terrorist tactics against the British[10]. This leads to the second factor by looking at the actors leading the intelligence war against the British authorities in Dublin castle and how they went about this.

One major issue with intelligence agencies are how security they are against moles within their ranks, which can lead to leaks of information useful to their opposition. In the 1919 onwards the IRA had spies in Dublin castle and …of all the Dublin unformed police … six were working for Collins[11]with this Collins and the IRA were able to know their enemies intelligence capabilities. This enabled Collins to counter British intelligence efforts in apprehending suspected Irish nationalists like Collins planning to commit acts of sedition was …giving him a priceless advantage[12].

Collins used this advantage intelligently by identifying intelligence officers (IO) who themselves are in the field identifying suspected Irish nationalist threats[13]. With this Collins and the IRA …deliberately targeted [through a] campaign of murders… [by] murdering undercover British intelligence officers and Special Branch police officers as prime targets[14]. This highlights Collins terrorist tactics as an intelligence war by taking out the eyes and ears of British authorities in Dublin castle, leaving them without the means to gather HUMINT against the Irish.

It must be stated that although the British had a major setback in the murders of the ‘G’ division in the Bloody Sunday of 1920, crippled the government’s attempt to recover its position[15]by replacing them with new intelligence officers. However their star operators were gone and those now coming on the scene were not anything like as good[16] leaving them blind and outclassed by the intelligence war waged by Collins. Who had had well placed agents throughout the government … and by intimidating or killing detectives, IO and their agents, he protected his own intelligence department[17].

Keeping tight control of information coming towards the British Collins was ruthless in executing informers whether through …interrogation and torture … later … shot by Reggie Dunne[18]ensured any form of intelligence leaks as strongly dealt with. In turn … the local IRA was impelled to or chose to resort to terror on a wide scale in order to discourage the passing of information to the British[19]… without information that can be analysed for any useful intelligence against the Irish.

Confounding the British efforts to combat the Irish through their counter espionage the army’s novice intelligence officers found many guerrillas there for the taking and rapidly decimated key IRA units[20]. The success of arresting these guerrillas we short lived as the failing judicial system and repeated politically motivated releases of prisoners in 1916, 1917, 1919 and 1920[21]. It’s important to note that, successfully defeating an enemy released and entrenched within the population, the Irish people, a government trying to win support on their side they must separate the population from Collins and the IRA to … create a sense of security and predictability to replace…  violent uncertainty[22].

With the failure to separate the Irish nationalist guerrillas from the general population the British failed to comprehend the damage they were doing on the force attempting to regain control of Ireland is that the intelligence war occurred as ... a particular political agenda rather than for military reasons[23]. Adding to this the recommendations of the police to keep those that were deemed ‘dangerous’ were ignored[24]. This leads to the final factor by comparing military intelligence to political intelligence in the period leading up to the Anglo-Irish treaty.

The British bolstered the police presence in Ireland by recruiting ex-soldiers from the Great War, who were not trained for counter insurgency warfare. They were provoked into action by the IRA murder campaign ‘Bloody Sunday’. This served to guarantee popular support in Ireland for the continuing IRA campaign… [and] exploited [for] propaganda relating to police atrocities[25]. In kill[ing] suspected British agents… arguably more significant for its ramifications as a calculated political act … for the atrocities … it provoked[26] in alienating the Irish population. What can be learnt from this in terms of intelligence is that policy makers must not only be aware of the intelligence in operational level, it must also take into consideration the political ramifications of atrocities being committed by the agency that represents them to their target population, the Irish and British people, for fear of losing their support.

Attacks from the Irish nationalist movement and the brutal patterns… [of] assassination and counter-assassination, sabotage and reprisal[27], Westminster was forced to use of ever more draconian coercive measures under the Restoration for Order in Ireland Act[28]. The effect is further alienation of the Irish population and driving them towards the nationalist movements and this …contributed to a mounting chorus of criticism in Britain… of the government actions[29]. Hughes-Wilson succinctly sums the lesson when he states.

“Repression, if too oppressive, merely traps and contains the explosive forces of political change and reform”[30]

This is arguably the most succinct statement to describe how British failure in clearly identifying actions that damage their image towards the British and Irish population, without the intelligent use of intelligence in negating negative political.

In conclusion through winning the intelligence war both militarily and politically the Irish defeated the British in the period 1916 – 1921. Their success came from the Mishandling of the leaders of the Easter Uprising in 1916, which created martyrs for the Irish nationalist movement. The importance in terms of this mishandling of the leaders are the lessons of not allowing an enemy becoming martyrs for their cause through the use of political intelligence intelligently.

From the martyrdom came this ground swell of support for Irish nationalism came the rise of militants that enabled Michael Collins to create the IRA willing to wage intelligence warfare by spectacular acts of terrorism. This was achieved by having penetrated Dublin Castle with his spies within the DMP and RIC. Through them Michael Collins successfully targeted British intelligence officers of the ‘G’ division that were operating undercover. Because of the lax security within Dublin Castle the need to tighten screening of personnel is highlighted to ensure personnel profiling are in place in identifying ‘moles’ in government agencies which the British failed to implement.

Adding to the success of Michael Collins ‘squad’ is the British lack of coordination between the police, military and military intelligence in fighting the IRA, however, it must not be forgotten that the British did succeed in their set mandate of maintaining law and order. But because they were not fighting a war against the IRA their actions were limited and even hindered by the continuous shifts in policy that were aimed at conciliating nationalist opinions. What can be taken from this is that force multiplication can be applied effectively to combat superior force and frustrate the British into politically disastrous retaliation on the Irish population as a whole.

Last the British confounded their failures by the desperation displayed in the last year of the Irish War of Independence by enacting oppressive laws towards their Irish problem. They failed in identifying a solution in winning the intelligence war by not having political intelligence in determining their actions against the Irish. In sum, Intelligence cannot be abstracted from its political context and presented as a merely technical exercise in information gathering[31].

With these factors the British were defeated by the Irish in their intelligence war against them. This raises the question of how can these lessons be applied in today’s war against terrorism by Western governments within their own borders and outside of them.

[1] Peter Hart, British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 3

[2] Adam N Shulsky and Gary J Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd ed., Washington D.C. 2002 p. 4

[3] Ibid. p. 5

[4] Andrew Christopher, The Defence of the Realm; The authorised history of MI5, London 2010, pp. 86 - 87

[5] Ibid. p. 88

[6] Ibid. p. 90

[7] Ibid. p. 618

[8] Peter Hart, British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 9

[9] Adam N Shulsky and Gary J Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd ed., Washington D.C. 2002 p. 8

[10] John Hughes-Wilson, The Puppet Masters, Great Britain 2004, p. 388

[11] David Neligan, The Spy in the Castle, London 1999 p. 122

[12] Peter Hart, British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 1

[13] David Neligan, The Spy in the Castle, London 1999 p. 122

[14] John Hughes-Wilson, The Puppet Masters, Great Britain 2004, p. 388

[15] Peter Hart, British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 2

[16] David Neligan, The Spy in the Castle, London 1999 p. 125

[17] Peter Hart, British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 10

[18] Ibid. p. 125

[19] Gabriel Doherty & Dermot Keogh (eds.), Michael Collins and the making of the Irish State, Cork 1998, p. 74

[20] Peter Hart, British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 10

[21] Ibid. p. 10

[22] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla; fighting small wars in the midst of a big one, New York 2009 p. 205

[23] Peter Hart, , British Intelligence in Ireland 1920 – 21, Cork 2002, p. 14

[24] Ibid. p. 15

[25] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af04.shtml accessed 31/01/2012

[26] Gabriel Doherty & Dermot Keogh (eds.), Michael Collins and the making of the Irish State, Cork 1998, p. 72

[27] http://digitalarchive.gsu.adu/history_theses/46 accessed 31/01/2012

[28] Ibid. p. 72

[29] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af04.shtml accessed 31/01/2012

[30] John Hughes-Wilson, The Puppet Masters, Great Britain 2004, p. 207 (Andrew, 2009)

[31] Ibid. p. 15

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