A greater awakening of Asian countries, a force economically and militarily.

There is something to be said about today’s us foreign policy regarding its continuing insistence in creating the ‘myth America’ of utopian proportions, and it stems from the roots of US society. History has taught and shaped it to create a demarcation of an inner looking out to the outer – though the world is no longer a huge expanse due to globalisation, it still feels like the frontier, the Wild West. Based on how the identity of the US formulates its policies to meet the perceived threats to its way of life (Bush and Keyman 1997, 311-328). This paper will focus within the Asian-Pacific region as the current tension has the impetus to push at the established order of the Post-Cold War, and more importantly there is a greater awakening of the Asian countries as a force to be noticed economically and in recent times militarily.

This paper will argue that ideological differences between communism and capitalism have not wavered even after the cold war, although the US enjoyed a period of being a unilateral hegemon that created a rule based world order. This order made it possible for the rise of the Asian-Pacific region countries and the mercurial economic and recently military rise of China that has acted suspiciously (Ross 2012, 2) and is not perceived as a threat by its close neighbours and the US. To back the argument we will look at four factors on how ideological differences between these two behemoth countries are influencing geopolitical environment.

 First we need to go back through time and look at the ‘myth America’ (Campbell 1998, 107) so that we can highlight and understand how their identity not only shaped but also is the driving force behind United States foreign policies adapted/implemented to justify the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ outsider. David Campbell argues [that] interpretations of danger have worked, and continue to work, to establish the identity of the United States. This means foreign policy, far from being an expression of a given society, constitutes state identity through the interpretation of danger posed by others. This goes beyond the idea that there are domestic sources to foreign policy, however. Working within the more general problematic of identity/difference, foreign policy, as the policy of making things foreign, helps establish the boundaries of inside/outside, domestic/foreign, civilized/barbaric etc. (Campbell 2008)

Second we need to look at the fundamental similarities in US foreign policy in the Cold War era to help us understand the actions that the US today is doing in trying to satisfy their paranoia of China that is now becoming a counter balance to US lead world order. Importantly we will see through this analysis that policies like ‘containment’ are relevant today as they were in the cold war era in reinforcing the identity of the US perception of the frontier boundary that have influenced it since its creation as a hegemonic state.

Third we will need to look at other political thinking that runs contradictory to the view that since the end of the cold war the world is no longer the same as it was in the cold war era (Ikenberry 2004, 609), however, it does not mean it is for the better. It just meant the rule based world order established allowed nation states to have dialogue and cooperative partnerships to settle disputes. With this factor we will see how quickly dialogue is lost when members of the order are perceived to be a threat and how identity is blinding or more importantly providing the impetus to ignore tell-tale signs that we are heading in the same road we were on at the height of the cold war.

Finally we will need to tie all these factors with the overriding knowledge that from the frontier/barbaric ‘other’ in the implementation of US foreign policy we will see that the fundamental differences of now’s’ policies with the cold war policies are at least allowing Washington to move towards a more evolved policy to suit the post-cold war world we all live in today. What this means is that the lessons learnt before do come into play, but the threats experienced these days are so running parallel to what they were, moving forward has the look of policies from the past Cold War era.

The ‘myth America’, what does it mean? And more to the point how did it come about to shape foreign policies the US have implemented to provide them with the security from the threats of the ‘other’. The question of where to begin will not help so we must look at the make-up of what the US has done within the last century to really see how far they have come in changing their ideological thinking from its American roots. The puritan ideology of a God given right to do what’s right and true to how the US is on the path of evangelical direction in dealing with any threats outside its boundaries. Throughout its short history we see a pattern emerge where there is an image of old English/European settlements being supplanted not in a literal sense towards the view of the world around America as a frontier. This notion of the frontier becomes a repetitive idea of first ‘Amerindians’ being  the perceived uncivilised barbarian then the ‘negro slaves’ who were instrumental in the American society to function yet are an ‘other’  to the isolationist policies pre-world war 2 (Campbell 1998, 109-132).

 What is highlighted here is that US society and its identity play a part to how it treats anything that is foreign as being un-American, and that’s what it is. A notion that anything perceived as being outside of the palisade or human perception will and have become the interpretation of danger, a danger to an American way of life. And Campbell is right when he says identity is not set in concrete, it is free flowing and changes based on the experiences. However, there is this deep rooted identity that changes but doesn’t change in how it interprets danger coming from the frontier. A paradigm shift moving away from ‘myth America’ that still nips at the seams of US unilateral world order. Although the Cold War is finished there are now fundamental differences in ideological reality in the Asian-Pacific region that is becoming the danger stemming from the great Chinese unknown which leads us back to the barbarian ‘other’ premised by Campbell.

So what are these fundamental similarities in US foreign policy between the Cold war era and Post-Cold war that are in effect, and deemed relevant based on American interpretation of danger. Similar policies the US had in the Cold War and still exist in Post-cold war – Containment through economic cooperation and ideological foreign policies, in examining this similarities we must establish what the policies meant for the rest of the states that were caught within these circumstances as they too played a significant part and were instrumental in being a counter balance to Soviet ambitions.

Examining how the policies affected middle powers in the Cold war period we have three factors that have fundamental similarities to post cold war policies, first Kennan ‘containment’ policy. Yes, this paper is in the stance that Kennan had inadvertently pushed the United States to adopt policies towards the USSR in ensuring their socialist ideology does not spread outside of Russia. So militarily the states within Europe were not threatened through ‘hard power’, in fact they were far from it, and the danger is through the spread of the ideology of communism. And the way they US countered this was through ‘containment’ by way of ‘soft power’. Now there were incentives that the states in Europe were benefitting in joining the US lead alliance (Dobbins 2008, 30-32), but the bottom line ensured that capitalism survived within the region and even flourished through economic pervasiveness. Playing against the US was Soviet totalitarian form of government that was instrumental in forming the impetus for the US to choose who they allied with. From a puritan point of view there is the underlying, meaning away from the public, a sense that only countries there were deemed worthy of being a friend became part of this imagined community, all democratic countries.

Post-cold war we still see this policy, although it is not directed at Russia, none the less China as a state still qualifies as a form of communism that has a totalitarian form of government, which however has adapted capitalism within its realm. It does not however detract from the fact that they are still a communist lead state with ideological difference to that of the US, and the allies it chooses are those that have embraced democratic process in the running of the government. And through these policies the allied states are benefitting through more access and security from US military power. AS can be seen from this the policy is shaped by the identity of the US as the ‘good guy’ through the protection of the weak as Professor Makinda stated in his lecture. What does this mean? Well we can see that through this identity and interpretation of danger within the ‘frontier’ the US is acting as a pivot to ensure there is no destabilising nation like China or Russia, and is willing to act in a leadership role with the smaller countries globally.

Obviously there are contrary opinions to how the cold war policies were formed; there are intellectual beliefs that the policies were a reaction to the actions of Russia as was the case in the Cold War period to China and its actions today. The orthodox thinking is that the cold war was a manifestation of insecurities created by the opposing side that drove US foreign policies to adapt’ containment’ but when we believe that it will mean then that policies are as fluid as identity since there have been changes in the ideology of even the Chinese when it allowed capitalism a foot hold within China’s interior. This leads us back then to David Campbell and his argument that there will be problems with identity/difference and how policies are making things different, the orthodox thinking seems to fall within this making thinks different as identity provides the impetus for the interpretation of danger that then reacts to the actions of the opposing side and the policies established as driven by the identity of the administration that create these policies in the first place.

Now this is very important since we have established that even through orthodox thinking identity still plays a role in creating the policies and when you apply them to what is happening with the Asian-Pacific region you will see that the Obama administrations Pivot to China is in essence a ‘containment’ policy that was salient in driving the threat posed by China to its close neighbours (Ross 2012, 2), and in turn because Obamas’ identity as an ‘American’ it is inevitable that the Pivot closely resembles ‘containment’ reminiscent to Cold War policies towards Russia (Walt 1989, 6).

 So now that we have established that identity and foreign policy are interrelated in ensuring the world we live in today is secure but with the risks of our way of life still around the corner we have the US to thank for its continued ‘good guy’ identity. But let us not forget that on the flip side of the coin communism as a movement looked to be on the brink of disappearing however it seems it has just been lying dormant and waiting for the opportunity to gain strength (Garthoff 1985, 31)and again rear its ugly head, ‘détente’ enable this to occur, through dialogue the ideological tension experience in the early days of the cold war has enabled China a communist state to rise and challenge US supremacy  by using the stable order created by the US in order to combat the Russians in the first place. What this teaches us is that although there has been an easing of tensions between the capitalism and communism there has not been a shift in their fundamental differences, and this again highlights how US ‘frontier/barbarian’ interpretation of danger is being played out again in an era where globalisation has enabled a small incursion in an unknown or less known part of the Asian-Pacific region.

In conclusion those ideological differences between communism and capitalism have not wavered even after the cold war and both the US and their opposing sides have been in dialogue and eased tension it however, does not solved the ‘other’ foreign ideology that is different. The interpretations of danger towards this foreign ‘other’ is driving the nail between the logs to stop them from meeting together in full contact or in other words there is no compromise when it comes to the identity and ideology of both movements as they are a stark difference to one another and is driving and reinforcing the puritan and frontier self with the outer ‘other’. It is unfortunate that although these two movements are great in their own ways the stark difference are forcing a wedge and it is being highlighted by the fundamental difference and even similarities with the foreign policies adapted by the US to try and manage the situation in order to protect its interest and at the same time ease allies fears of the other. The question that needs to be asked then is how will the world be like if one of these ideologies does manage to totally eradicate the other, will there be a true peace or will that be another precursor to an even great challenge that will determine the true extent of power plays between all nation states.

 Reference

 K. D. Bush and E. F. Keyman, "Identity-based conflict: Rethinking Security in a Post-Cold War World", Global Governance, 3(3), 1997, pp. 311-328.

 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

 David Campbell. 2013. Visual storytelling: creative practice and criticism: US foreign policy. http://www.david-campbell.org/politics/us-foreign-policy/

 James Dobbins, "Securing the Peace: Presidents and Nation Building from FDR to George W. Bush",Survival, 50(6), 2008/2009, pp. 29-48.

 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985), Chapter 2

 John Ikenberry, "Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age", Review of International Studies, 30(4), 2004, pp. 609-630.

 Robert S. Ross “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive”, Foreign Affairs, 91(6), November/December 2012, pp. 70-82.

 Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy", International Security, 14(1), pp. 5-49.