Wang Jingwei: Patriot, Traitor, or Both?

Wang Jingwei, overall, is a controversial figure in Chinese historical discourse. He started out as a Chinese revolutionary and was a major part of Sun Yat-sen's inner circle. Nevertheless, he is primarily known for his status as a "traitor" or hanjian (漢奸) in the eyes of many Chinese. This view is explicitly shared by both the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party of Taiwan and China respectively due to his decision to work with the Japanese Empire during the Second Sino-Japanese War and his resultant leadership of the Japanese puppet government known as the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China. His pre-war actions, especially during the Xinhai Revolution, contrast with his decision to join the Japanese government that made him a traitor in the eyes of many, despite his possible initial motives and intended outcomes. Therefore, the question of whether he was a patriot or not continues to be a hotly contested topic of debate. Relatively recent publications, such as an article by the South China Morning Post in 2010, describe Wang as a tragic figure who possessed a misguided sense of nationalism and led a life that could be seen as a "Shakespearean Tragedy" for the fact that he went from a national hero to a hanjian; such developments may indicate that the general populace is beginning to hold a more nuanced opinion about him as well, especially considering the SCMP's position as a widely read and relatively nuanced newspaper.[1] To provide a thorough evaluation of this topic, it is essential to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Wang's background. Nevertheless, he was still a patriot in his motivations. To what extent he could truly be regarded as one will depend on other factors.

"Wang Jingwei was many things. A poet, a revolutionary, the toast of his country and later its hated son, he wore so many hats it's easy to forget that he was, first and foremost, a politician. He chose his words carefully, knew how to read an audience, and was meticulous in advancing his own agenda. Therefore, if we are to understand this controversial figure, it is important not to just look at what Wang said or did at any one point in time, but at the ideas he held dear throughout his life.[2]"

As Fischer points out, while Wang Jingwei led an eventful life and served in a variety of roles, it must not be forgotten that Wang was ultimately a politician, and in order to understand him, one must scrutinize his core ideals. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that, despite his multifaceted life, Wang Jingwei was motivated by a specific set of ideas that nominally persisted as the major driving force for his decisions during the tumultuous times he lived in. In order to understand such ideas, a plethora of viewpoints must be considered before formulating an opinion on whether Wang Jingwei could ultimately be seen as a patriot or not; one must take into consideration three factors: his rhetoric, his actions and pragmatism, and the wider context of the times he lived in.

Wang Jingwei 汪精衞 was originally born as Wang Zhaoming (汪兆銘) in Sanshui, Guandong on May 4th 1883. Jingwei is a pen name that alludes to a mythological bird who hoped to fill the ocean with pebbles; such a name can be seen as an allusion to his ambitions. Wang was an avid poet who believed that his poetry conveyed his true character and would serve as his best testament.[3] In 1903, Wang was selected for a Qing Empire-sponsored scholarship in Japan. Whilst he was there studying politics, he joined the Tongmenghui in 1905, becoming close to Sun Yat-sen as a result.[4] Wang started supporting Sun's ambitions, and even wrote polemical essays for the nationalist newspaper Minbao (民報) where he started using the pen name Jingwei.[5] During this time he was exposed to Western thought and anarchist teachings, as well as a newfound belief that the Qing had weakened China; these may have compelled him to devise a plot to assassinate Prince Chun. The Qing authorities discovered his plot, but his sentence was reduced from capital punishment to life imprisonment because the authorities were impressed with his courage as well as the quality of his poetry.[6][7][8] This led to Wang being released from prison in the wake of the Xinhai Revolution as a national hero.[9] Afterwards he served as Sun Yat-sen's personal assistant, holding such importance that he was the only member of the Kuomintang to travel with Sun outside of KMT-held territory in the months before his death, even possibly drafting his will in the winter of 1925.[10] He became known for his proficiency as a skilled orator and was elected to the central committee, designated as chief propagandist. However, after the death of Sun, Wang faced competition from Chiang Kai-shek over the position of becoming Sun's successor. Chiang Kai-shek eventually was preferred by right wing members of the KMT in the wake of the Northern Expedition while Wang Jingwei was preferred by the left wing due to his willingness to negotiate with Communists despite his own personal distrust of them.[11] He eventually declared Wuhan to be the capital of the republic, though this exacerbated his rivalry with Chiang and culminated in the massacre of his communist allies by KMT forces loyal to Chiang, forcing Wang to publicly declare his allegiance to him.[12] Although Wang initially accompanied Chiang to the KMT wartime capital of Chongqing after the Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, he insisted that Western imperialism was a greater threat to China than Japan and became disillusioned with the way Chiang was waging the war.[13] In 1938 he went to Hanoi and publicly announced his willingness to collaborate with Japan.[14] The KMT responded by sending agents to assassinate him but he survived. On March 30th 1940 he was appointed as leader of the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China (中華民國國民政府), which consisted of Chinese territory that Japanese forces had occupied. In reality he held little authority and died in Nagoya on November 10th 1944 while undergoing medical treatment for the assassination attempt of 1938.[15]

Given the context of Wang's actions involving Imperial Japan, it is by no means a surprise that his name would appear in Japanese historiography. Texts by historian and honorary professor of Tokyo University Ryoji Motomura [16] and Tetsuo Shibata of Aichi Gakuin University are generally descriptive, rather than analytical in the way they approach Wang Jingwei. These authors devote much effort to provide background information on his life as well as the chronology of events that culminated in the formation of his collaborationist regime. Nevertheless, it is possible that the relatively descriptive nature of such narratives are connected to the official Japanese policy at the time that eventually recognized Wang Jingwei's regime as an official ally of the Japanese Empire, and it is possible that their narratives are more magnanimous than that of Chinese scholars. It can be considered notable that contemporary Japanese documents from the time are used in the retelling of narratives, and that attention is given to both the Japanese and Chinese perspectives as can be seen on the first page of Shibata's text, where he notes that in Japan Wang is still regarded by some to be a Chinese patriot and well-liked as a Japanophile, while in China he is seen as a hanjian and race traitor.[17] Shibata's perspective can be seen as an outcome of approaching Wang Jingwei from the perspective of the power he aligned with, instead of the perspective of the power that perceives him as a traitor. The perception could thus be seen as either a more nuanced perspective or one that is itself biased as it comes from the occupying authority that granted Wang his limited authority.

Although Wang Jingwei's actions in relation to Japan were objectively collaborationist, the context of the times is often overlooked. Collaborationism was in no way unique to China or Wang Jingwei's regime during World War II. Other countries conquered by Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany produced regimes similar to that of the Reorganized National Government, arguably the most infamous of these being Nazi-occupied Norway under Vidkun Quisling, whose surname has entered the English language as a synonym for traitor, in the same way that the name Wang Jingwei holds traitorous connotations in modern Chinese. Vichy France and Josef Tiso's Slovakia are also notable in that they were rump states formed out of countries occupied by Nazi Germany that were ruled by self-proclaimed patriots who worked with the occupier in the name of the people, similarly to Wang Jingwei. It must be remembered that collaborationism was motivated by a variety of factors including but not limited to a belief that the occupier would ultimately win, survival instinct, patriotism, and self-interest.

Margherita Zanasi compares the post-war treatment of hanjian such as Chen Gongbo, Wang Jingwei's second-in-command who was tried as he himself died in 1944, with the post-war trials of accused French collaborators such as Marshal Philippe Pétain. It has been emphasized that in both instances, China and France were occupied by invading powers, and that the leaders of local collaborationist governments that worked with the occupier defended their actions by claiming they had patriotic motivations. Chen claimed that he wanted to protect the Chinese people and "slowly erode Japan's control over China," while Pétain's defense compared his role to that of a "shield" protecting France from Germany while Free French leader Charles de Gaulle acted as the "sword" that actively resisted Germany.[18][19] Zanasi notes that while such trials and defenses were common across European countries formerly occupied by Germany and comparative research among them has taken place, comparisons between European cases and that of Chinese collaborationism remains rare.[20]

The situations of collaborationism in other Asian countries occupied by Japan should be given attention in relation to Wang Jingwei's regime. In practice, Wang Jingwei was a puppet for Japan with little real power in his Reorganized National Government, notwithstanding a 1943 treaty with Tokyo that formally granted him more authority.[21] Nevertheless, the question of why this is seen negatively, in the light of other Japanese backed puppet regimes and their leaders such as Sukarno in Indonesia and Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia requires further consideration. Both men were "Japanese puppets" like Wang who possessed little real power. Yet unlike their Chinese counterpart, they are respectively seen as a unifier and a national hero in modern Indonesia and Cambodia. As a result, one should ask why collaborationism in the case of Wang Jingwei makes him a polarizing figure. One argument is that Sukarno and Sihanouk ultimately demonstrated more resistance to European colonizers and used the Japanese occupation to build up a force capable of driving out the Dutch and French Empires after the war, and that Japan's occupation of Indonesia and Cambodia were seen as inspirations in a way as it proved that Asians could defeat European empires. This would also play well into the Japanese Empire's stated goal of creating a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" where Asian peoples would drive out European and American colonizers. However, the Empire in practice exploited the Asian peoples it conquered and it was only when the tide of war started to turn that Japan decided to take its rhetoric regarding Pan-Asianism more seriously; the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943 was a manifestation of this newfound attitude by Japan, as it in turn resulted in more autonomy for Wang Jingwei's regime and others under Japanese domination.[22] The resultant outcome is that collaborationism is not black and white and Wang's actions in this context and whether they were justified or not remains contentious. Nevertheless, the more pertinent question is whether his collaborationism discredits his patriotism-fueled motivations.

When discussing the position of Wang Jingwei, the concept of hanjian and their role in the Second Sino-Japanese War as collaborators will inevitably be raised. The term is inherently problematic due to it literally meaning "traitor to the Han (Chinese)" and this implies that one does not get to choose their national loyalty. Wai Chor So presents the view that the argument of fighting Western (particularly Anglo-American) dominance used by Chinese collaborators to justify their actions only really gained traction after the start of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States and that Wang Jingwei initially turned to the Japanese side in the hopes of gaining a favorable settlement and ending the Second Sino-Japanese War.[23] Such a viewpoint may indicate that Wang did not have Chinese interests in mind, and could be considered a reason to brand him as a traitor. Nevertheless, Wang still decided to fervently support Japanese war efforts against Britain and the United States while reviving Sun Yat-sen's ideology of Pan-Asianism as a justification; this in turn culminated in the use of racial and cultural elements to promote "Pan-Asian unity" against the West to further convince his party and compatriots that he wanted to establish peace with Japan in order to thwart the "imperial aggression" led by white people.[24] In addition to contextualizing the concept of Pan-Asianism as a struggle against Anglo-American aggression, Chinese collaborators held a vague notion that a common Eastern culture and a common racial descent would help create a common identity, making Pan-Asianism a reality; Sun Yat-sen's claim that the Russo-Japanese War was a "victory for the yellow race over the white race" gave further gravitas to the ideal of Asian unity.[25] This greater vision and Wang Jingwei's resolute support for this could be classified as an expression of Chinese patriotism in the light of justifying an alliance with Japan.

Whether Wang's decision to become head of the Reorganized National Government and support Japan was a patriotic decision on his part is up for debate. One argument that could be made is that his decision was done for pragmatic reasons. Wang believed that the KMT had lost, and as a result decided to align himself with Japan in the hopes that he could alleviate the sufferings of the Chinese people.[26][27] By this logic it can be argued that Wang chose the most pragmatic route to helping his nation. Additionally, while the collaborationist regime he ruled is criticized for having had little real power in practice, terrorizing the populace or turning a blind eye to Japanese forces doing so, and for its overall ineffective rule, it should not be forgotten that such grievances could also be brought forth regarding Chiang Kai-shek's government. The KMT had an authoritarian character not unlike Wang's government and the Communist Chinese state that emerged after the war, and repression of the populace and overall inefficacy are arguments that could be brought against both the KMT and CCP, raising the question as to why Wang Jingwei's regime should be viewed differently. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek's initial reluctance to fight the Japanese Empire in the years leading up to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was justified as pragmatism rather than a lack of patriotism.[28] By this logic, Wang Jingwei's decision to align himself with Japan could be seen through the same lens.

An enduring question regarding Wang Jingwei's legacy is whether he can be regarded as a Chinese patriot. Motivation-wise, it cannot be denied that Wang Jingwei considered himself a patriot. All of his actions were done with what he considered China's best interests in mind. The earliest manifestation of these motivations can be seen even before the establishment of the Republic of China when he aligned himself with Sun Yat-sen and became a vocal supporter of the Tongmenghui. Over the years, Wang's claims of being a patriot were corroborated by his rhetoric claiming that the Anglo-American "West" was the enemy and his endorsement of Pan-Asianism that justified both his patriotism and decision to work with Imperial Japan.[29] He also claimed that he was carrying out the ideology brought forth by Sun Yat-sen—an assertion also shared by his rivals such as Chiang.[30][31]

Chinese nationalism/patriotism and the state of Chinese politics at the time as a whole are topics germane to the question of whether he was a patriot or not. Wai Chor So elaborates upon the background of the Republic of China's political disposition and the situation of Chinese nationalism by focusing on the relationship between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei; Frederic Wakeman explores whether the Republic of China in the 1920s could be considered a fascist state. These aforementioned efforts can be considered explorations of Wang Jingwei's contemporary circumstances that may have influenced his worldview. In So's work, it is explained that Wang and Chiang were both in a position to cooperate on the Kuomintang's dealings with Japan despite Wang possessing greater political prowess, but a key difference is that Wang believed no power would come to China's aid in the event of a Sino-Japanese War, while Chiang was willing to align China with ideological enemies including the Soviet Union.[32] Nevertheless, this fact is contrasted by the earlier and later decisions of both leaders; Wang's Wuhan government was established with the aim of cooperating with Chinese Communists, and Chiang remained staunchly opposed to the Chinese Communist Party to the point that he only agreed to form a United Front against Japan after his own subordinates forced him into doing so during the Xi'an Incident. As a result one should wonder if Wang's patriotic sentiments metamorphosed over time, especially given his opposition to the Kuomintang's allying with the CCP, a decision that was made unilaterally by Chiang as Wang was recovering from an assassination attempt at the time.[33] Wakeman describes Wang's rivalry with Chiang in the context of the late 1920s and early 30s, by elaborating on how Chiang was becoming increasingly authoritarian; Wang is even listed as a figure that attempted to form a separate government against Chiang in 1931.[34] It can be argued that this resulted in Wang's eventual disillusionment with Chiang. Thus, this could explain why this may have been a crucial factor behind Wang's eventual disillusionment with Chiang. Wang's rhetoric before, during, and after these times can be seen as reflecting the complex state of Chinese patriotism in these times. Consequently, his motivations can be seen in a new light by highlighting the problems of the initial government he was a part of. Furthermore, one must consider whether his actions line up with his rhetoric and if they can be considered pragmatic if they don't.

Was Wang Jingwei a patriot? A concise answer would be both yes and no. While his name has become synonymous with betrayal in China, the reality remains more complex, and it is necessary to maintain a nuanced discourse as a result. He was indeed a patriot in that he both considered himself one and demonstrated patriotism in his motivations and rhetoric. However, if a patriot is defined as an individual whose actions line up with their rhetoric, then the answer becomes more obscure. Wang Jingwei decided to work with an invading power despite claiming to be a patriot and whether this discredits his claim to be a patriot or not is a matter of perspective. A self-proclaimed patriot choosing to collaborate with the occupying power could be dismissed as treachery or self-interest. Alternatively, it can be evaluated as a pragmatic act given the chaotic context of the times that required difficult decisions. It should not be forgotten that his contemporaries abroad in the context of World War II made similar choices regarding their relationships with occupying powers in the name of survival and oftentimes justified it with their own sense of patriotism. The treatment of such leaders ranged from similar disdain after the war to lionization as national heroes. Additionally, many of the faults attributed to Wang Jingwei could be seen as characteristic of both the KMT and CCP, yet both regimes claim themselves to be patriotic and acting in the best interests of the Chinese people. Ultimately, what is clear is that Wang Jingwei was immediately vilified by the victorious KMT and CCP after the war for his position as head of a collaborationist regime, and as a result objective and nuanced discussions regarding his legacy have remained elusive until recently. In the end, Wang Jingwei was most certainly a patriot in some ways, and to unilaterally dismiss him as a traitor is an absurd and unfortunate outcome of the victors writing the narrative while attempting to sanctimoniously affirm their own decisions and actions as virtuous. And in this case, the victors, especially with regards to this particular theater of war in China, were equally at fault as their designated scapegoat Wang Jingwei in masking their own incompetence, mistakes, and war crimes.

[1] O’Neill, M. (2010, March 28). The tragic lives of a national hero turned traitor and the wife who stayed loyal. Retrieved from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/article/709876/tragic-lives-national-hero-turned-traitor-and-wife-who-stayed-loyal

[2] Fischer, T (2018). "Stones in the Sea: Wang Jingwei, Nationalism, and Collaboration". Honors Theses - All. 2025. https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/etd_hon_theses/2025 pp. 114

[3] Yang, Z. (2015). The Road to Lyric Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang Zhaoming (1883-1 944). Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR), 37, 135-164. pp. 136

[4] O’Neill, M. (2010, March 28). The tragic lives of a national hero turned traitor and the wife who stayed loyal. Retrieved from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/article/709876/tragic-lives-national-hero-turned-traitor-and-wife-who-stayed-loyal

[5] Yang, Z. (2015). The Road to Lyric Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang Zhaoming (1883-1 944). Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR), 37, 135-164. pp. 138

[6] So, W. (2011). Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators. Modern China, 37(1), 69-103. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/25759539 pp. 62

[7] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (6, November 2019). Wang Ching-wei. Retrieved from Encyclopædia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wang-Ching-wei

[8] Yang, Z. (2015). The Road to Lyric Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang Zhaoming (1883-1 944). Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR), 37, 135-164. pp. 139

[9] O’Neill, M. (2010, March 28). The tragic lives of a national hero turned traitor and the wife who stayed loyal. Retrieved from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/article/709876/tragic-lives-national-hero-turned-traitor-and-wife-who-stayed-loyal

[10] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (6, November 2019). Wang Ching-wei. Retrieved from Encyclopædia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wang-Ching-wei

[11] Hwang, D (2000). Wang Jingwei, The National Government, and the Problem of Collaboration. PhD Dissertation, Duke University. UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor Michigan. pp 118

[12] Fischer, T (2018). "Stones in the Sea: Wang Jingwei, Nationalism, and Collaboration". Honors Theses - All. 2025. https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/etd_hon_theses/2025 pp 26

[13] O’Neill, M. (2010, March 28). The tragic lives of a national hero turned traitor and the wife who stayed loyal. Retrieved from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/article/709876/tragic-lives-national-hero-turned-traitor-and-wife-who-stayed-loyal

[14] So, W. (2011). Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators. Modern China, 37(1), 69-103. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/25759539 pp. 72

[15] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. (6, November 2019). Wang Ching-wei. Retrieved from Encyclopædia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wang-Ching-wei

[16] 本村凌二 (2013年6月13日). “【世界史の遺風】（62）汪兆銘 「漢奸」と断罪された「愛国者」”. 産経ニュース (産経新聞社) 2019年11月1日閲覧。https://www.sankei.com/life/news/130613/lif1306130034-n1.html

[17] 柴田哲雄.愛知学院大学教養部紀要第66巻第２・３合併号（2019）「汪兆銘伝のための覚書き」pp.13-63

pp.13 日本では今なお一部の人々の間て、中国の愛国者にして親日家として、根強い人気を誇っているのに対して、中国ては「漢奸」、すなわち売国奴として唾棄されてきた。

[18] Zanasi, M. (2008). Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration. The American Historical Review, 113(3), 731-751. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/30223050 pp.731

[19] Ibid. pp. 732

[20] Ibid. pp. 731

[21] O’Neill, M. (2010, March 28). The tragic lives of a national hero turned traitor and the wife who stayed loyal. Retrieved from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/article/709876/tragic-lives-national-hero-turned-traitor-and-wife-who-stayed-loyal

[22] Gordon, A (2003). The Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. Oxford University Press. pp. 211

[23] So, W. (2011). Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators. Modern China, 37(1), 69-103. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/25759539 pp.70

[24] Ibid. pp. 78

[25] Ibid. pp. 78-79

[26] Fischer, T (2018). "Stones in the Sea: Wang Jingwei, Nationalism, and Collaboration". Honors Theses - All. 2025. https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/etd_hon_theses/2025 pp. 96

[27] Yang, Z. (2015). The Road to Lyric Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang Zhaoming (1883-1 944). Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR), 37, 135-164. pp. 162

[28] Wakeman, F. (1997). A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism. The China Quarterly, (150), 395-432. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/655343 pp. 407

[29] O’Neill, M. (2010, March 28). The tragic lives of a national hero turned traitor and the wife who stayed loyal. Retrieved from South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/article/709876/tragic-lives-national-hero-turned-traitor-and-wife-who-stayed-loyal

[30] So, W. (2011). Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators. Modern China, 37(1), 69-103. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/25759539 pp. 70

[31] Wakeman, F. (1997). A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism. The China Quarterly, (150), 395-432. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/655343 pp. 397

[32] So, W. (2002). The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Modern China, 28(2), 213-252. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/3181354. pp. 215

[33] Ibid. pp. 241-43

[34] Wakeman, F. (1997). A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism. The China Quarterly, (150), 395-432. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/655343 pp. 297-98