Military industrial complexes and ministries of defense are turning their strategy and capabilities as well as their doctrine after decades of tensions between East and West. The old cold wars, powerful and huge mastodons, are ending his life of service and a new future looms on the horizon.
Financial constraints, the international context and the fragility of economies point to a new type of production, pointing to change the docrtine with which the armed forces have. The big budgets of the twentieth century were exhausted so everything their productive systems and the weapons they produced are being replaced - by a few more also - by much cheaper systems modern ones. So much so that the old Soviet doctrine of "more is better", as it was with the T-34 medium tank, is being retouched by Western systems.
Currently, the modularity of the systems takes full attention from nations: cheap systems are sought, easy to build, that achieve relatively high speeds, are combat efficient, and can carry a variety of weaponry. Bases such as the Stryker or JLTV (this one with lower combat performance than expected and stipulated by its producer) are performing modifications necessary for the adaptability of these systems with SAM (sourface to air missile) and GTAM (ground to air) portable missiles.
Versatile in every way, with great ability to deploy quickly via air and armed to the teeth, these systems can be mini fortresses displaced along the battlefield, so countermeasure-oriented systems should be as or more priorities than ofensive sistems. Chaffs, flares, laser detectors, among many other countermeasure systems that add to traditional defense (armor and defensive barriers).
Now, the more modern, the more expensive. All operating systems needed to handle a capable defense on these systems are highly costly (in addition to the cost of the base vehicle). In today's international context, the West produces extremely expensive armoured vehicles for the economies profess to defend, as is the case of Latin America, where regional economies hardly give enough to stay afloat (some better than others) and they do not have as their main objective to make their armed forces a world power.
A single exception can be made in this section with the nation of Brazil, where there is a magnificent state policy that points to a retrofitting of the forces as well as a modernization of its systems driven by internationally renowned companies such as Elbyt Sistems and its Brazilian subsidiary. Another side-by-side case is the nation of Peru, a homeland moved to constant equipment and updated by fears and the fearnes of possible conflicts with nations like Ecuador and Chile, with whom there is significant tension at the geopolitical level.
In this context, new international buying opportunities arise (which the United States treats and succeeds in thwarting after imposing sanctions on buyers) as this is the case with Russia. Currently, the American giant punishes Turkey for the acquisition of S-400 systems, and planned to do the same with Peru if it were to be decided to purchase the Mig-29 or Mig-35 systems.
This leads us to the difficult decision that, if nations wish to retrofit their armed arms to defend their sovereignty, states should aim national military industrial complexes to equip themselves. Domestic production may be under the tutelage of more experienced companies, but countries must achieve nearly 100% independence in order to feel truly confident in their defensive and offensive capabilities. This requires investment and truly state policies.
We all row for the same horizon, let's do it together.
Photo by Benjamin Behre on Unsplash