In August 1914 in Italy and the rest of Europe a war of a few weeks, at most a few months, was expected. The military had the Franco-Prussian War as a model, while civilians thought it was not possible to sustain a conflict that, by calling millions of men to arms, would have limited industrial and agricultural production. The generals obtained from the government extensive powers to intervene in the country, according to the principle that all matters concerning the war were the exclusive competence of the military authorities. Paradoxically, the political autonomy of the military leadership decreased as the war continued and the difficulties at the front increased. The high commands were unable to develop a suitable strategy to overcome the barrier of the trenches which, with the armaments of the time, gave an overwhelming superiority to defence. Technological innovations were not enough to change the situation; chemical weapons were unreliable because they were too variable from weather conditions, tanks and aeroplanes still in a pioneering phase. Only the submarine played a substantial role, but the First World War was above all a land combat, where artillery and machine guns were decisive.
The supreme commands were surprised by the evolution of the conflict: since the initial war of movement, the western and Italian-Austrian fronts stabilised in a position war. The hell of trench life began. Hygienic conditions did not exist, waste and corpses rotted in "no-man's land" (the territory that separated the opposite trenches). The moment of maximum tension was dawn when the risk of an enemy attack or one of your own was greater. In this case, the soldiers had to climb over the parapet and run without shelter towards the enemy fire. When there were no attacks, the soldiers spent the day in the company of small animals with which they shared the trenches, especially mice and fleas, waiting for mail and food from the rear. At night, protected only by the darkness, some patrols would go out into no-man's-land to repair the protection of the trenches, place explosives or perform small actions. These living conditions had a profound effect on the psychology of the fighters; they developed a sense of detachment both from the soldiers stationed in the country or the high commands far from the front and from their families at home, to whom they were unable to communicate the traumatic experience. After intense bombardment, the infantry came out of the trench under enemy artillery fire. If successful, usually, the conquered territory was very small, a few hundred meters, at most a few kilometres.
In June 1916, on the Somme, the British discharged over 1,500,000 shells into german trenches, but on the day of the offensive 60,000 men were lost, including 21,000 in the first hour. There was no way to overcome the well-established enemy. The exception was the Austro-German breakthrough at Caporetto, which cost the Italian army the loss of more than half a million men, including dead, prisoners and stragglers, and about half of the artillery, but even this offensive had stopped due to the logistical and movement difficulties of the large cannons. The replacement of Cadorna after Caporetto's defeat marked a turning point in the management of the Italian army. Diaz remained in constant contact with the government; put an end to the great offensives; he maintained the harsh disciplinary regime, but no more decimations; above all, it improved living conditions at the front: shorter shifts on the front line, better food, safe licenses, service for the morale of soldiers and officers. The defensive victory over Piave in June 1918 and the offensive of Vittorio Veneto led to the armistice with Vienna and, on November 11, with Berlin. The war for Italy was won, it remained to be won after the war.
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