The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become a strategic disaster for Iran. As the terms of the ceasefire agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan pose a serious threat to Iran's long-term strategic interests. The consequences of this could affect the perception of the Iranians by their regime, as well as a change in Iran's policy towards Azerbaijan and Syria, writes Dyanesh Kamat in his article in EuroActive.
"Azerbaijan now has full control of its border with Iran along the Araks River. Although it may be a celebration in Baku, Tehran is concerned. This is due to the fact that the expansion of Azerbaijan's border with Iran will allow Israel to enter a larger area from which it will be possible to control Iran. Despite Baku's denials, it is no secret that Israel and Azerbaijan are actively cooperating on intelligence, energy and military issues.
Azerbaijan is one of the largest buyers of Israeli weapons. The use of Israeli "kamikaze" drones in the war played an important role, although the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones were recognized as a real turning point in this war. In addition, both countries maintain deep intelligence ties. And if Tel Aviv launches air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Azerbaijan will most likely play a vital role as a gas station or a starting point.
Another consequence of the war is the creation of a transit corridor through Armenia, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan. This corridor, in which Russian troops will be stationed, will probably be parallel to the Armenian border with Iran. This has already caused concern in Tehran, as it could effectively block Iran's entry to Armenia and later to Europe via Georgia. It is very important for a country that already suffers from international sanctions to have access to friendly neighbors.
In connection with the panic, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi had to state directly that the transport corridor would not threaten Iran's entry into Armenia. It is noteworthy that soon Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif will leave for Moscow and Baku for a more detailed discussion of this issue. More importantly, however, it should be noted that the capital he will not visit is Ankara, another important winner of the conflict. Turkey will keep its troops in Azerbaijan and will now have direct access to the Caspian Sea through the proposed Nakhichevan-Azerbaijan corridor. Now he can also have a direct impact on Central Asia, which is Recep Tayyip Erdogan's cherished dream.
Tehran also noted Russia's reluctance to provide comprehensive assistance to its ally Armenia. It has become clear that Russia will gladly sacrifice its ally if he gets too nervous. In this conflict, Moscow was more committed to the letter of its alliance with Yerevan than to its spirit, declaring that its security commitments extended only to Armenia. Moscow allowed Azerbaijan to regain all the lost territories, allowing Armenia to retain the territories around the Nagorno-Karabakh capital. Moscow maintained its influence in the region by deploying peacekeeping forces in Karabakh and along the proposed Nakhichevan-Azerbaijan corridor.
Moscow will also be happy to see the departure of Prime Minister Pashinyan, whose political career seems to be over. It also seems to be guided by its broader goal of preventing Turkey from deviating from its Western orbit. Tehran's shrewd politicians are likely to draw the right conclusions from this, especially in terms of what this could mean for Bashar al-Assad, Iran's ally in Syria. Seeing the aspirations of Russia and Turkey to come to an agreement, Tehran is likely to urge the Assad regime to end the war.
The main internal impact that the conflict will have on Iran's domestic policy is likely to be psychological. This is another blow to Iran's image as a regional hegemon. In fact, the fact that Tehran was an outside observer of the conflict and had no chance of influencing its outcome will revive memories of the two Russian-Persian wars of the 19th century that forced Persia to relinquish control of the entire South Caucasus.
This shows the Iranian people that Iran no longer has the economic power, technological perfection, or attractive political model to influence a region that has been under Persian influence for centuries, I would say millennia since the Achaemenid Empire.
In general, this is another violation of the rule of law in Iran since 1979. "