I have already commented in previous articles about the battle in which we are immersed in Bitcoin Cash with two sides that I am going to call BCH IFP and BCH non-IFP. The mining calculation power battle ("Hash War") will take place on November 15, 2020.
Most likely all miners mining blocks on the BCH IFP branch will do so using the Bitcoin ABC node client software, while those on the non-IFP BCH branch will do so using the BCHN node client software ; Although for this last branch there are more options, I am going to simplify the problem in order to facilitate the understanding of my approach.
In addition to a battle between groups of developers, there is a very important media battle on social networks, full of tricks to discredit the contrary. I want to pay particular attention to the comment of BCHN supporters who say that their node will always follow the chain with the highest accumulated computing power. This assertion has, like almost everything in life, advantages and disadvantages.
The advantage is the good press it provides, since in the eyes of those who only see the tip of the iceberg this "goodness" makes them gain followers for their cause.
The downside is the risk for non-IFP BCH miners that the blocks they find will eventually be scrapped due to possible reorganizations if the BCH IFP branch eventually accumulates more work over a period of approximately 100 minutes.
The reorganizations are impossible, to this day the non-IFP side has signaled a greater endorsement of Hash Power, or not?
If we go to the only current source of what the miners are going to do from day D (November 15, 2020), everything seems to indicate that at the moment it is:
Source: https://cash.coin.dance/blocks/summary
This value evolves continuously, at the time of writing the article, 53.2% were indicated in favor of BCHN (BCH non-IFP). There is no sign in favor of ABC.
So it seems very clear that the majority of miners' HP is in favor of the non-IFP BCH camp. However, the devil appears in details that cannot be seen with the naked eye.
The signaling in favor of BCHN in a block until D-day has no cost / inconvenience.
Mining with BCHN from day D (and hour H which will be 12:00 AM UTC) does have a cost in the form of the risk that the block you find will finally be discarded.
There may be miners who currently signal one thing and finally do another while trying to deceive their competitors (Sybil attack). The lack of "Sybil protection" is the Achilles heel of this and other signaling systems as mechanisms to reach a consensus, such as the BMP ("Bitcoin Mining Parliament"). The situation is much worse if we take into account that BCH is a minority, just over 2.2% currently, of the rewards to its miners within the pie that all miners capable of mining the same algorithm share.
The incentive system that exists with the cards face up (the IFP is a "Soft Fork" and once it is known what intentions each miner will have), allows a gamification that favors the miners who follow the BCH IFP branch over the miners that follow the non-IFP BCH branch.
How can that risk be reduced?
I envision three alternatives:
Manually force separation by coordinating all nodes and executing the InvalidateBlock command "000 .... xxx".
Algorithmically force separation a priori by implementing "replay protection".
Force separation a posteriori.
The first of the solutions has the advantage that it can be handled like an ace up your sleeve, that is, only use it if necessary. On the contrary, the problem of a coordination of all the nodes appears through the execution of a command that has to be entered manually in each and every one of the nodes and in the shortest space of time. This option could also lead to wear and tear on the image because it would show a breach of the "goodness" from the start, although I think that this wear would go unnoticed by most observers.
The second of the solutions has technical drawbacks, implementing replay protection involves updating each and every one of the programs that explicitly want to follow said blockchain, but in return the risk of rejection of their blocks for miners disappears completely. In addition, and this is the factor that I consider most important, they will again use the machinery of superficial public opinion so that they see this side as the one that took the measure that most favored the interest of all, when the reality is quite another. , reduce the risk of being defeated from day D hour H, and as a consequence that there is no non-IFP BCH blockchain.
The third option has the disadvantage that in the face of the ecosystem it will do so from a position of "loser" of the settled battle, although it will be a perfectly valid option.
For these reasons, I believe that the non-IFP BCH camp may soon announce the implementation of a "Replay Protection" mechanism, again under the shell of being the good guys in the movie.
