Man, by nature, tries to stay away from evil. It is true that no one ever wished for evil for the sake of evil. It is not because evil has become desirable in and of itself that man commits acts of evil. However, it implies the feature of what is good, as anything that brings or leads to a sense of fulfillment. In the moral situation given, that refers to the Distraction-Starvation dilemma; "The general army knows that by laying waste to the opponent country's crops, he will greatly inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of supplies. The enemy is well-supplied at the moment, but crop damage will destroy future supply. Many farmers and their families will face immediate privation and famine as a result of such destruction, but it will ultimately aid in the victory of a fair war. Is it permissible for the general to devastate the farmlands?" It can be seen and examined in this circumstance that there is a direct intended thought with two effects, one good and the other detrimental. In addition, this incident demonstrated the concept of a double effect. "A double effect refers to the fact that actions frequently have several outcomes, i.e. acts can have side effects" (Oddny Wiggen and Lene Bomann-Larsen2004 p.4).
The phenomenon of double effect becomes a moral problem when the side-effects are not desirable, and especially when they are harmful for those affected. But does this act that produces good and bad effects may be morally permissible? To reconcile this ideas it can be analyze through the principle of double effect and followed by the principles of indirect voluntary act; to further explain the imputability of the evil effect indirectly willed. The principles of double effect and indirect voluntary act is specifically intended as a guide to decision-making in ethically difficult cases where an action or course of action with an intended good effect can also produce a foreseen bad effect. This will help in order to have a concrete and justifiable answer to the general question, "May the general lay the waste in the farmlands of its enemy to win a just war despite of it's evil effect?".
In the foresaid moral situation, it can be analyzed that there is a moral culpability in the act of the agent, whom is the general himself. The general's plan of laying waste to the farmlands of the enemy's country is a directly willed act, but those evil effects (the starvation of many farmers and their families) are not directly willed by him. Thus, he foreseen the consequences of it, both good and evil. He is completely and fully aware that if he pursues and performs his directly willed act, an evil effect will sprout along the way which is not directly willed by himself. The question is, when does those evil effects that are not directly meant become imputable to the agent or the doer of the act? A directly willed act whose evil effect is not directly willed holds the agent responsible, provided that the principle of indirect voluntary act is employed whose conditions are fulfilled; (1) The evil effect must be foreseen or foreseeable in the performance of the act, at least in a general way. Common sense gives anyone the capacity to foresee an evil effect, albeit indirectly, happening as it proceeds from a human act being performed. (2) There must be freedom to choose not to do the act which is the cause of the evil effect. As previously learned, a free act is elicited by the will having the power to choose to do or not to do it. However, freedom cannot be exercised if there is no light of knowledge in the intellect. To foresee an evil effect means the light of knowledge is at play, such that the agent can exercise his freedom to withhold the performance of an act from which the said effect stems. (3) Refraining from doing the act which is the cause of the evil effect becomes the moral obligation of the agent. Reason dictates that when the evil effect is foreseen or foreseeable and the agent is free, he is morally obliged not to pursue the performance of an act which serves as the cause of the effect. The general's thought of laying waste to the farms of his enemy's country as a way of helping his own nation and winning a just war, gives him the common sense to foresee the indirectly evil effect, that is, the starvation of many innocent civilian farmers and their families in the country. Therefore, fulfilling the first condition, the general as a human being who has freedom to exercise his free will and as the head of the military force of his country, is, of course, free to choose not to pursue his plan/thought of laying waste to his enemy's farmland, which has the evil effect of starving many farmers and their families due to the destruction of crops and lack of future supplies, fulfilling the second condition. Foreseeing the evil effect and being free to choose not to do the act of laying waste, the general himself is ethically responsible to refrain from doing the act. Thus, the third condition is fulfilled.
In this situation, the general is ethically responsible for the directly willed conduct that results in an indirectly willed evil effect. That is why the general should not destroy his enemy's farmland since he is liable and accountable for his actions. Why? Because actors are responsible for such adverse consequences even when they are foreseen and they choose to proceed. Nonetheless, actors are responsible for detrimental side effects if they allow them to occur when they could have been avoided, or if they make no, or only a minor, effort to mitigate them. The foregoing side-effect concerns are entailed by the notion of double effect, commonly known as the double effect principle. Even though, based on the conditions of the principle of double effect, the destruction-starvation dilemma is excusable, it has two effects. One is good, the other one is evil because it passed the standards of its conditions and because the doctrine of double effect is perhaps known as the 'just-war' tradition. Wherein it points out that civilian casualties are just collateral damage from military operations and wars. But in the principles of indirect voluntary act, the general is considered imputable to the indirect willed evil effect. It can be concluded that a person can be responsible in the sense of being accountable for the harmful or wrongful actions of other people if, by their own actions, they have enabled or aided them. This means that an individual's obligation as an agent not to do harm extends to the obligation not to provide others with the means of doing harm; while not an absolute obligation, it is nonetheless a strong one. It also means that our obligation to prevent harm being done by others becomes a more stringent, agent-related obligation when the harm in question is something that we ourselves have provided others with the means of doing.