The American exit was perhaps even more shambolic than its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Indeed, there is never an elegant way to retreat from a war that has long been lost. Yet, the shameful flight was extremely shocking.
The radical Islamist movement had ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, imposing a harsh, regressive, authoritarian order. Their return has inevitably evoked the memories of that repressive era, which had pushed Afghanistan into perhaps the darkest period of its recent history.
The Taliban then had imposed harsh social policies, which included forcing women to wear burqas, banning music and television, and implementing harsh criminal punishments for petty offenses. Women were banned from working and were not allowed access to education.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan became a centre of activities for Al Qaeda and other transnational jihadi groups. It turned into a pariah state. Except for Pakistan and, for a brief period, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, no other country recognised the regime.
While the new dispensation is yet to take shape, there is growing anxiety, both in Afghanistan and outside, over the prospect of the return of a similarly authoritarian rule. There is also the question of whether the Taliban 2.0 would be any different from the past radical Islamist regime led by late Mullah Omar, the supreme leader and founder of the movement.
The impact of the seismic change in Afghanistan goes beyond its borders. And, indeed, the resurgence of the Taliban, after their ouster from Afghanistan in 2001, also took place beyond the country’s borders.
TALIBAN RESURGENCE
Once the US air bombardment began in early October 2001, the Taliban were ousted in quick succession from most of Afghanistan’s cities. They pulled out from Kabul within hours of the American-backed Northern Alliance forces entering the city and put up no resistance.
Taliban fighters melted into the population or took sanctuary across the border in Pakistan. Most of the leadership survived the offensive and moved to Pakistan — with the prominent exception of Mullah Omar, who stayed back in Afghanistan. In that initial displacement period, senior leaders were fragmented and disunited over what they should do next. The shock and trauma of the fall of their regime had paralysed the leadership. The organisation had crumbled.
There was no structure with which to regroup and revive. While some were determined to fight, others were more inclined to explore negotiated political options. The Taliban’s isolation increased, as their support among the Afghan people declined.
In the first 18 months after being ousted from power, the movement faced the danger of fracturing. Some elements even broke away to form their own factions. Occasional statements and threats from senior leaders condemning the occupation found little traction among the Afghans.
It took more than two years for the Taliban to recover and rebuild their structure. But the rebirth had more to do with the failures of their opponents. The absence of governance by the new US-installed dispensation had led to a complete breakdown of law and order in eastern Afghanistan. It had brought back the rule of rogue warlords. The Taliban and their family members, who had laid down arms and moved back to their villages, and tribal elders, were targeted by the newly installed administration.
It was déjà vu, a return to the early 1990s situation that had originally led to the rise of the Taliban militia. The victims, of the new source of abuse, began contacting the Taliban leadership that had begun regrouping in Quetta.