Link to an experimental translation below:
讓我們創建一個雙贏的基礎設施融資計劃
https://read.cash/@Big-Bubbler/-4c2e00df
I think we can create a great plan that makes most real BCH-Fans happy. I am going to suggest some ways to do that. I would love to hear ideas from others and constructive criticism on my ideas. I think we need to get funding of development for making BCH ready to scale for massive worldwide use before it is too late and much of our market niche gets filled by other tech such as Apple Pay and the other "tap Pay" stuff getting advertised now. BCH opponents hope we will postpone funding and real progress on scaling for 6 months or longer. They say our blocks are already larger than needed and we can wait to fix that issue if we ever need to in the future.
IMO, The Goal: An automated system for letting BCH miners donate X% of the block rewards all BCH miners have earned to BCH infrastructure developers. I propose a 100% voluntary system that let's the BCH-miners choose what percent to donate, how long the donations will continue and what projects to fund. It is their money after all.
How do Pro-BCH miners let us know their choices? I expect anti-BCH-funding forces will try to game any system of miner voting to make the % lower and see to it the donations do as little good for BCH as possible. I assume the anti-BCH-funding miners have a lot more hash than the pro-BCH miners.
Choosing donation % I am not sure this is a practical solution, but, I am thinking pool operators create a variety of pools with specific donation levels and specific funding targets. Then miners just join the pool(s) they prefer and leave if they want to stop donating. I would expect low-donation and no-donation pools will try to muscle out the higher donation pools, so, I wonder if there is a way in the code to incentivize higher donation levels? Maybe a sliding-scale difficulty adjustment adjustment that makes it slightly easier to get block-A if you donate more to block-A? I would probably consider minimum and maximum adjustment adjustments to avoid gaming this feature. Could making the DAA more difficult for pools not donating at all replace the "orphaning blocks" idea? Their blocks are still good, but, harder to get? In the spirit of keeping this voluntary, we also need a way (maybe automated? miner activated?) to turn this whole donation system off if support for donating goes away.
My idea of 100% voluntary donation-mining will probably only work if enough hash to "fully mine" the BCH chain volunteers by joining the donation pools. I do not think I have heard from anyone about the likelihood of that. BCH only needs a small amount of overall hash rate, so, I would think there is plenty of hash willing to support our development. I think coming up with a community supported plan might go a long way towards making the miners more willing to commit.
Choosing funding targets You could multiply hash rate times donation percentage to determine mining pool voting power for a vote on this, but, if we are letting the pools (or sub-pools within pools?) have a designated funding target, that would overrule that sort of approach. I think there needs to be a set and pretty-small list of options for the pools to choose from. Burning will not be an option since that is not good for BCH. Some of the options could be proxies* that make the decision for the miners. If any miner does not like their decisions, they can switch pools. I would like to see pool switching be easy, if possible. It might be good to have an inter-pool way of signalling for the desire to move to a specific sub-pool and minimum amount of hash be signaled before that sub-pool gets activated to keep pool operators from having to run tiny pools (if that is a bother for them?)?
How do we keep anti-BCH forces from getting a donation target into the options-list to be used to sabotage the goals of BCH? For instance, some consider BU and the new BCN may be readying to get used as attacks on BCH. If any attackers are on the list, will anti-BCH miners line up to mine and donate to them to turn the donations into attacks on BCH? I have not come up with a real solution to this potential problem yet. I may be seeing see why Amaury started with a tiny list (of what I consider great choices - even if he got the list from miners). I think I would like to see the list be chosen by miners who are not also going to be the pool operators running the donating pools.
*Proxies: Could be something like a committee of 5? trusted community members who (and who's employer or any financial supporter) will not recieve any block reward donations from any of these pools. Proxies might be designated as intended to fund specific goals like a particular road-map goal (or goal set) or possibly designated for new projects that apply to them for the funding. I think a few pool operators who have shown they support donating to BCH development (and have no development projects they have invested in that might get funding) could be considered as proxies. Proxy teams would be allowed and encouraged to listen to advice from the people who are not free from potential financial conflicts of interest.
I do not believe this funding will be sufficient to fully fund all the great projects that deserve funding. I do not care if it is the controversial ABC that does it, but, I hope we start out emphasizing making the protocol scale for massive worldwide adoption as I think that is where the big profits are waiting for holders, miners and developers. If we have that and we get the killer app or event that takes BCH viral, it will make this funding much bigger and we will even drag BTC up in price as we rise. IMO, having such a moment try to happen before we can handle the load would not be a good idea.
The Haters will continue to Hate
Anti-BCH forces will still hate any good plan (because it is good for BCH) and will claim everybody hates it. Some anti-IFP folks want to avoid attempting to create a win-win plan now so they can divide the community and grab power from our lead developer (they may dislike) and the ABC team before they support a better plan. Many miners are either anti-BCH or neutral-BCH-pure-greed-based miners that do not want a donation system to cause even a tiny amount of hash rate to move off of BCH to the BTC chain. I think the Miners opposed to this for pure-greed reasons (which is acceptable behavior in this space) are not seeing or caring about the likely longer-term price-benefits of better development funding on BCH. The upside allowed by developing the ability to scale massively for worldwide use are off the charts more profitable for all of them.